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1. Introduction
Philosophers,	historians,	and	sociologists	of	science	have	long	agreed	
that	there	is	no	single	scientific	method.	How	to	best	generate	knowl-
edge	depends	crucially	on	the	kind	of	knowledge	in	question,	as	well	
as	technological,	social,	and	theoretical	context,	and	the	kind	of	system	
the	investigation	targets:	what	we’ll	call	the	“epistemic	situation”.1	Ac-
cepting	that	good	knowledge-production	admits	of	a	plurality	of	meth-
ods,	and	that	these	are	more	or	less	appropriate	in	different	epistemic	
situations,	leads	us	to	the	possibility	of	method	mismatch.	The	adopted	
method	might	be	 inappropriate	 for	 the	 epistemic	 task.	Method	mis-
match	 likely	occurs	due	to	method	bias:	 tacit	or	explicit	 ideas	about	
knowledge-production	might	influence	scientific	practice.	Our	target,	
then,	 is	 how	 opinions	 about	 good	method	 in	 a	 scientific	 communi-
ty	—	as	 reflected	 in	 publishing	 practices,	 for	 instance	—	might	 influ-
ence	the	nature	and	productivity	of	that	community.	
In	this	paper,	we	articulate	a	form	of	method	plurality,	allowing	us	
to	explore	both	mismatch	and	bias	vis-à-vis method.	We’ll	understand	
method	 plurality	 by	 distinguishing	 between	 two	 properties	 of	 evi-
dence.	First,	what	we’ll	call	sharpness:	how	incisive	evidence	is	regard-
ing	a	hypothesis.	Second,	what	we’ll	call	independence:	the	amount	of	
overlap	between	the	background	theory	which	underwrites	different	
1.	 For	fuller	discussion	of	this	notion,	see	Leonelli	2016,	Currie	2018.
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We’ll	 analyse	 and	 explore	 method	 plurality,	 mismatch,	 and	 bias,	
via	 agent-based	 modelling,	 which	 we	 introduce	 and	 utilize	 in	 sec-
tions	3	through	5.	We	construct	an	epistemic	landscape	which	repre-
sents	the	two	properties	of	evidence	which	interest	us.	We	then	add	
agents	which	adopt	 the	 strategies	we’ve	mentioned,	and	publishing	
standards	which	reflect	the	community’s	method	bias.	We’ll	establish	
a	link	between	properties	of	the	landscape	and	the	success	of	different	
strategies.	Some	landscapes	favour	obligates,	others	omnivores.	We’ll	
then	 explore	 the	 effects	 of	method	 bias	 by	 considering	 to	what	 ex-
tent	changing	publishing	standards	can	influence	the	kind	of	evidence	
which	is	generated	in	the	population,	and	the	make-up	of	the	popula-
tion	in	terms	of	strategies.	
According	to	our	model,	method	bias	can	maintain	a	diversity	of	
strategies	and	evidence	in	a	community.	This	can	occur	even	when	the	
landscape	heavily	favours	one	strategy	over	another.	Moreover,	mak-
ing	it	easier	for	the	disadvantaged	strategy	is	more	effective	than	mak-
ing	it	harder	for	the	favoured	strategy.	Finally,	the	trade-off	between	
method	bias	and	a	community’s	productivity	is	not	simple:	often	gains	
in	one	arena	are	not	equally	matched	by	losses	in	another.	This	sug-
gests	that,	under	some	conditions,	maintaining	a	diversity	of	scientific	
strategies	can	actually	increase	the	productivity	of	a	community	over-
all.	Before	describing	our	simulation	work,	in	section	2	we’ll	analyse	
sharpness	and	independence.
Our	primary	goal	in	this	paper,	then,	is	to	identify	and	analyse	an	
otherwise	unnoticed	kind	of	bias	whose	recognition	is	made	possible	
through	 a	 commitment	 to	method	pluralism	 and	 a	 recognition	 that	
some	methods	are	more	useful	 in	some	contexts	 than	others.	 In	do-
ing	 so,	 we	 also	make	 original	 use	 of	 “epistemic	 landscape”	models,	
both	in	the	dynamics	they	instantiate	and	in	how	we	interpret	them.	
We’ll	finish	in	section	6	by	discussing	circumstances	in	which	method	
bias	might	be	particularly	egregious,	and	by	arguing	that	philosophi-
cal	 analysis	 which	 approaches	 evidence	 abstracted	 from	 aspects	 of	
epistemic	 situations	—	community	 standards	 in	particular	—	are	 inad-
equate	for	many	instances	of	knowledge	generation	in	science.
evidence.	 In	 light	 of	 this,	we’ll	 characterize	 two	 scientific	 strategies,	
one	targeting	sharpness	—	methodological	“obligates”	—	and	the	other	
targeting	independence:	methodological	“omnivores”.	We’ll	then	con-
sider	 under	what	 conditions	method	mismatch	 could	 occur,	 explor-
ing	 two	 aspects	 of	 epistemic	 situations:	 first,	 the	 evidential	 context	
investigators	face;	second,	community-level	preferences	for	different	
evidence	types.	
We’ll	not	claim	that	method	bias	is	necessarily	problematic:	indeed,	
as	we’ll	show,	sometimes	introducing	it	can	ensure	a	diversity	of	strat-
egies	are	employed.	Moreover,	given	that	method	bias	is,	in	effect,	a	
community’s	preference	for	types	of	evidence,	it	is	often	unavoidable.	
The	take-home	message	is	that	the	make-up	of	a	scientific	community	
depends	both	upon	evidential	context,	and	upon	what	is	recognised	as	
“good	evidence”	or	practice	 in	that	community.	Publishing	standards,	
funding	decisions,	 the	opinions	of	 referees,	and	so	 forth	affect	what	
kind	 of	 work	 gets	 done.	 Recognising	 that,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 differ-
ent	investigative	strategies	are	more	appropriate	in	different	contexts,	
while	on	the	other	hand,	opinions	about	what	good	science	looks	like	
might	either	follow	or	work	against	those	contexts,	allows	us	to	see	
the	kinds	of	effects	method	bias	might	have.	Moreover,	this	itself	un-
derwrites	an	argument	that	understanding	scientific	evidence	without	
taking	the	relevant	community’s	views	about	good	evidence,	and	the	
epistemic	 situation,	 into	 account,	 is	wrong-headed.	 Indeed:	we’ll	 ar-
gue	that	consideration	of	such	community	properties	 is	required	for	
understanding	evidence.
In	 addition	 to	 these	 points	 about	 the	 social	 epistemology	 of	 sci-
ence,	we	also	take	ourselves	to	be	making	a	contribution	to	discussion	
of	how	we	should	understand	and	make	optimal	epistemic	progress,	
under	 constraint,	 in	 a	Bayesian	 framework.	This	more	 technical	 dis-
cussion	largely	plays	out	in	the	footnotes,	specifically	footnotes	8,	12,	
18,	20,	and	21.2
2.	 We	thank	an	anonymous	referee	for	pointing	out	this	angle,	and	for	helpful	
suggestions	on	how	to	make	it	explicit.
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On	 the	 one	 hand,	 evidence	 can	 be	more	 or	 less	 sharp.	 Brandon	
(1997)	understands	how	“experimental”	a	study	is	in	part	by	the	extent	
to	which	experimental	results	 test	 the	relevant	hypothesis.	The	epis-
temic	“power”	of	a	result,	or	set	of	results,	to	establish	or	falsify	a	con-
jecture,	varies.	Sharpness,	then,	is	a	relationship	between	results and	
hypotheses. Dull	results	are	ambiguous	vis-à-vis hypotheses;	sharp	evi-
dence	speaks	clearly	and	firmly.	For	this	to	occur,	background	theory	
must	connect	the	investigation’s	results	to	the	hypothesis,	and	alterna-
tives	must	be	accounted	for.
Sharpness	 is	best	understood	probabilistically.	Evidence	 is	 sharp	
vis-à-vis a	hypothesis	 to	 the	extent	 to	which	the	unconditional	prob-
ability	 of	 the	 hypothesis	 is	 lower	 than	 its	 likelihood	 given	 the	 evi-
dence	in	question.	That	is,	sharp	evidence	has	a	high	likelihood	ratio.	
In	Bayesian	terms,	“sharpness”	is	a	measure	of	how	much	we	should	
update	our	beliefs	in	light	of	the	evidence.	Dull	evidence	will	raise	our	
credence	but	a	little,	while	sharp	evidence	has	major	effects.8	It	is	plau-
sible	 that	many	experimental	 strategies	 aim	 to	maximize	 sharpness	
(consider	 Cleland	 2002,	 Currie	 &	 Levy	 forthcoming,	 for	 instance).	
Controlling	 for	 confounding	 factors	 lowers	 ambiguity;	 the	 results	
exclude	more	possibilities.	Multiple	runs,	controlled	conditions,	and	
other	 features	 of	 experiments	make	 for	 powerful,	 convincing,	 sharp 
results.
8.	 Things	are	not	as	simple	as	they	may	seem	here:	on	many	Bayesian	accounts,	
evidence	for	a	proposition	has	diminishing	returns	—	that	is,	if	my	confidence	
is	 already	 very	 high,	 evidence	which	 in	 other	 contexts	might	 be	 very	 tell-
ing	would,	on	this	account,	be	dull.	There	are	several	moves	open	here.	One	
might	adopt	a	four-place account	of	sharpness,	relative	to	(1)	the	hypothesis	in	
question,	(2)	the	observations	or	data,	(3)	background	theory,	and	(4)	the	cur-
rent	beliefs	of	the	relevant	agents	(this	could	be	a	three-place	account	if	back-
ground	theory	determines	current	beliefs).	Alternatively,	one	might	adopt	a	
counterfactual	account,	understanding	sharpness	as	the	amount	by	which	a	
rational	agent’s	credence	would	increase	in	light	of	the	evidence	if their	priors	
were	suitably	 low.	Or,	one	could	abandon	the	subjectivism	of	Bayesianism	
and	adopt	an	externalist	account	of	evidence:	thus,	there	is	some	non-agent-
relative	fact	of	the	matter	about	sharpness.	There	may	be	subtle	differences	
in	the	construal	of	our	model	based	on	these	decisions,	but	as	we	discuss	in	
footnote	21,	our	model	will	cohere	with	a	wide	variety	of	precisifications.
2. Sharpness & Independence
In	this	section	we	provide	conceptual	underpinnings	for	the	remainder	
of	the	paper.	Although	methodological	pluralism	takes	diverse	forms,	
it	suits	our	modelling	approach	to	focus	on	two	diverging	properties	
of	evidence:	“sharpness”	and	“independence”.	We’ll	first	briefly	discuss	
method	pluralism,	before	spending	some	time	developing	and	clarify-
ing	these	two	evidential	properties	and	briefly	pointing	to	examples	
where	these	notions	are	plausibly	in	scientific	play.
A	“scientific	method”	 is	a	strategy	 for	doing	science:	how	should	
scientists	go	about	generating	knowledge?	The	kind	of	 “disunity”	or	
“pluralism”	 that	 concerns	us	here	denies	 that	 science	 can	be	unified	
by	a	single	method3	(see	Feyarabend	1975	for	a	classic	defence	of	this	
claim).	That	is,	there	is	no	one	privileged	strategy	for	generating	scien-
tific	knowledge	that	is	distinctive	of	it.	Rather,	method	is	context-sen-
sitive.	There	is	room	for	disagreement	about	which	aspects	of	context	
matter,	and	to	what	extent:	some	emphasize	the	social	and	political,4 
others	research’s	public	import,5	others	the	kinds	of	systems	the	inves-
tigation	 targets.6	Regardless,	 that	 good	 science	 admits	 a	plurality	of	
method	—	that	it	is	“disunified”	—	we	take	to	be	generally	agreed	upon.
In	our	model,	agents	adopting	different	strategies	compete	by	try-
ing	to	maximize	different	properties	of	evidence.	We’ll	call	one	“sharp-
ness”,	the	other	“independence”.	It	is	useful	to	begin	with	the	old	truth	
that	observations	do	not	count	as	evidence for	or	against	a	hypothesis	
simpliciter	 bodies	of	background	 theory	are	 required	 to	 connect	our	
hypothesis-driven	expectations	with	an	investigation’s	results.7	The	re-
lationship	between	background	theory	and	evidence	underwrites	two	
evidential	properties.
3.	 It	is	worth	pointing	out	that	this	disunity	thesis	is	weaker,	and	does	not	nec-
essarily	come	hand-in-hand	with	the	stronger	metaphysical	claims	of	Dupré	
(1995)	and	Cartwright	(1999).
4.	 See,	for	instance,	Shapin	&	Schaffer	(1985)
5.	 For	instance,	Douglas	(2000),	Brown	(2013).
6.	 Currie	&	Walsh	(2018),	Weisberg	(2013),	Matthewson	(2011).
7.	 See,	for	instance,	Bogen	&	Woodward	(1988).
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overlapping	background	theory,	then	a	single	mistake	can	lead	to	the	
failure	 of	 both.	 Independence	 is	 graded:	 some	 measures	 will	 have	
more	or	 less	overlapping	 justification.	And,	 indeed,	overlaps	can	be	
more	 or	 less	 problematic	 depending	 on	how	firmly	 established	 the	
overlapping	theory	is.	Although	independence	is	in	principle	a	virtue,	
it	 is	 important	to	note	its	 in-practice	limitations.	Evidence	generated	
from	 different	 procedures	 can	 be	 incongruent:	 background	 theory	 is	
required	 to	 “translate”	between	evidence	generated	by	different	pro-
cedures	using	different	 language	 (Stegenga	 2011).	 Further,	 often	dif-
ferent	evidence	 is	used	 to	support	different	aspects	of	a	hypothesis:	
they	merely	cohere	rather	than	converge	in	the	sense	independence	
requires	(Currie	2018,	ch.	8;	also	Mayo-Wilson	2011).10 
Nancy	 Cartwright	 (2007)	 makes	 a	 related	 evidential	 distinction,	
and	 it	 is	worth	 clarifying	 the	 difference	 between	 her	 approach	 and	
ours.	She	distinguishes	between	clinchers —	a	form	of	evidence	which	
is	very	strong	(deductive)	but	narrow	in	scope	—	and	vouchers,	broader	
evidence	which	simply	adds	inductive	weight,	but	doesn’t	“clinch”	the	
deal	for	the	hypothesis	in	question.	Clinchers	are	narrow	because	of	
their	deductive	nature:	“The	assumptions	necessary	for	their	success-
ful	application	will	have	to	be	extremely	restrictive	and	they	can	take	
only	a	very	 specialized	 type	of	evidence	as	 input	and	 special	 forms	
of	 conclusion	 as	 output”	 (12).	 Evidence’s	 sharpness,	 or	 the	 indepen-
dence	of	a	set	of	evidence,	doesn’t	entail	whether	we	should	think	of	
that	evidence	as	a	clincher	or	a	voucher:	that	turns	on	how	restrictive	
the	assumptions,	and	how	special	the	outputs	and	inputs,	must	be	for	
evidential	relevance.	However,	as	we’ll	mention	in	section	6.1,	highly	
sharp	evidence	 is	 likely	 to	have	the	restricted	scope	that	Cartwright	
identifies	with	clinchers.11	We	can	further	specify	sharpness	and	inde-
pendence	using	formal	machinery.	We	don’t	think	the	formal	machin-
ery	is	strictly-speaking	necessary	for	our	purposes,	and	less	technically	
minded	readers	might	prefer	to	go	straight	to	section	3.
10.	 Thanks	to	an	anonymous	referee	for	suggesting	these	clarifications.
11.	 Thanks	 to	 an	 anonymous	 referee	 for	 pointing	 us	 towards	 Cartwright’s	
distinction.
On	the	other	hand,	variety-of-evidence	reasoning	relies	on	indepen-
dence.	We	can	understand	“independence”	as	the	extent	to	which	lines	
of	evidence	rely	on	varied	background	theories.	Consider	proxies	of	
past	 temperature.	Surface	 temperature	fluctuations	 in	 the	deep	past	
can	 be	 detected	 by	 (among	 other	 things)	 boreholes,	 and	 preserved	
pollen	grains	in	sediment.	First,	the	temperature	variation	at	different	
vertical	positions	of	boreholes	tracks	temperature	variation	at	the	time	
of	deposition.	Second,	pollen	quantity	 tracks	plant	productivity,	and	
as	this	is	sensitive	to	temperature,	fluctuations	in	pollen	quantity	can	
tell	us	about	temperature	fluctuations	across	time.	Again,	data	are	not	
evidence	 for	 free:	 borehole	 temperature	must	 be	 controlled	 against	
warmth	 from	 the	Earth’s	 core,	 for	 instance.	So,	both	proxies	 require	
background	theory	for	evidential	relevance,	but	—	crucially	—	they	re-
quire	different background	theory.	That	is,	they	are	independent, and	in-
dependence	can	sometimes	carry	important	epistemic	consequences	
(see	Forber	&	Griffith	2011;	Fitelson	2001;	Heesen,	Bright,	&	Zucker	
2014;	Stegenga	2009).9 
Imagine	that	both	borehole	and	pollen	data	converge	on	the	same	
pattern	 of	 past	 temperature. Because	 the	 evidence	 relies	 on	 differ-
ent	bodies	of	 background	 theory,	 for	 the	world	 to	 refuse	 to	 cooper-
ate	—	that	is,	for	the	convergent	predictions	to	turn	out	false	—	distinct	
failures	are	required.	If	temperature	estimates	from	both	borehole	and	
pollen	 data	 converge,	 but	 those	 estimations	 are	 false,	 separate	mis-
takes	 are	 required	 for	 each	 source.	 Perhaps	 our	method	 for	 pollen-
gathering	 introduces	bias;	perhaps	 interior	warming	 in	our	analysis	
of	 borehole	 data	 was	 faulty.	 In	 this	 circumstance,	 the	 convergence	
would	be	a,	perhaps	very	unlikely,	coincidence.	 Independence,	then,	
is	a	virtue.	Under	 the	 right	conditions,	 if	 the	measures	converge	on	
the	same	result,	then	it	is	likely	to	be	the	right result,	as	otherwise	both	
must	mess	up	but	coincidentally	converge.	 If,	however,	data	rely	on	
9.	 The	term	‘robustness’	is	sometimes	used	in	discussion	of	‘independence’;	we	
prefer	the	latter	term,	as	‘robustness’	is	also	used	to	discuss	virtues	of	models	
and	experimental	setups	which	are	not	directly	related	to	the	evidence	they	
generate.
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independence,12	but	the	simulation	we	introduce	in	section	3	can	rep-
resent	most	of	these.
So,	we	can	distinguish	between	how	sharp	evidence	is,	that	is,	its	
lack	of	ambiguity	vis-à-vis a	hypothesis,	given	background	theory;	and	
its	independence,	that	is,	the	amount	of	overlap	between	background	
theory	pertaining	to	different	evidence	sources.	In	our	model,	both	of	
these	properties	will	be	represented	on	a	landscape.	The	former	will	
be	the	height	dimension	of	the	landscape	—	higher	values	will	repre-
sent	sharper	evidence.	The	 latter	will	be	represented	as	distance	on	
the	landscape.	The	distinction	also	allows	us	to	explain	the	two	strate-
gies	adopted	by	agents	on	the	landscape.	
12.	 There	are	different	ways	of	characterizing	independence	(thanks	to	an	anony-
mous	referee	for	encouraging	us	to	expand	on	this	point).	Stegenga	&	Menon,	
for	instance,	distinguish	between	probabilistic	independence	(which	is	closer	
to	what	we	have	 in	mind)	and	ontological	 independence	(2017).	Although	
we	discuss	independence	in	terms	of	(lack	of)	overlap	in	background	theory,	
there	are	other	ways	 to	go	within	a	Bayesian	 framework,	and	subtleties	 to	
how	one	 formalises	 it	with	 respect	 to	different	measures	of	evidential	 sup-
port	 (Fitelson	 2001).	We	 take	 independence	 to	 be	 a	 relationship	 between	
two	 (or	more)	 instances	of	evidence	 (E1	and	E2)	and	a	hypothesis	 (H)	 for	
which	 they	 can	 potentially	 provide	 confirmation	 (and	 not,	 it	 is	 important	
to	note,	a	two-way	relationship	between	instances	of	evidence,	or	methods	
for	generating	them).	However,	a	datum	does	not	become	evidence	for	(or	
against)	a	particular	hypothesis	without	the	background	knowledge	(K)	that	
connects	 the	datum	 to	 the	hypothesis	and	allows	 it	 to	perform	 the	 role	of	
evidence:	P(E|H∩K)>P(E|¬H∩K),P(E|H∩¬K)≈P(E|¬H∩¬K).	Thus	we	get	to	our	
notion	of	independence:	it	is	the	extent	to	which	the	parts	of	the	background	
knowledge	(K
1
	and	K
2
)	that	underpin	the	confirmation	relationship	between	
the	different	data	 and	 the	hypothesis	 are	 independent	of	 each	other,	 such	
that	 a	 fault	 in	 one	would	 not	 undermine	 the	 strength	 of	 the	 other;	 for	 in-
dependent	 sources	of	evidence,	P(E1∩E2│H∩K1∩K2)> P(E1∩E2│H∩K1∩¬K2 
)>P(E1∩E2│¬H∩K1∩¬K2),	whereas	for	non-independent	sources	the	second	
inequality	does	not	necessarily	hold.	Another	way	to	look	at	independence	is	
in	terms	of	the	hypothesis	screening	off	the	probabilistic	connection	between	
the	different	data	 (Sober	 1989).	 For	 independent	 sources	of	 evidence,	 it	 is	
the	truth	of	the	hypothesis	(rather	than	some	other	aspect	of	the	world)	that	
makes	both	data	turn	out	in	a	way	that	supports	the	hypothesis.	On	this	view,	
for	independent	sources	of	evidence,	P(E2│E1)> P(E2│E1∩H).	As	we’ll	discuss	
below,	we	 think	our	approach	 to	modelling	 independence	 (and	 sharpness,	
for	 that	 matter)	 handles	 the	 majority	 of	 approaches	 to	 precisifying	 these	
notions.
Consider	 two	situations.	 In	situation	1,	we	are	trying	to	establish	
whether	 hypothesis	 h	 is	 true.	Our	 prior	 is	 low,	 say	 p(h)=	0.01	 (per-
haps	h	is	a	putative	causal	pathway,	and	there	are	numerous	possible	
pathways	consistent	with	our	background	knowledge).	By	 investing	
resources,	we	can	increasingly	refine	a	method	m	that	will	generate	
data	 set	D.	Given	background	knowledge,	we	know	 that	 if	 the	data	
set	 yields	 evidence	 that	 confirms	 our	 hypothesised	 pathway,	 that	
evidence	will	be	powerful,	say	p(h|e)	=	0.95.	Furthermore,	our	back-
ground	knowledge	could	indicate	that	the	data	set	D	is	likely	to	pro-
duce	evidence	for	one,	and	only	one,	of	the	competing	hypotheses	we	
are	currently	entertaining	within	set	H,	such	that,	say,such	that,	say,
Then	we’ll	say	method	m is	very	sharp.	
In	situation	2	we	will	have	two	methods,	m
1	
and	m
2
, generating	data	
sets	D
1	
and	D
2
. Following	notation	from	above,	the	situation	here	will	
be	of	dull	evidence:
However,	we	will	add	a	special	boost	to	the	posterior	 in	the	case	of	
evidential	convergence:
In	such	a	case,	we	will	say	the	two	methods	m
1	
and	m
2	
are	highly	 in-
dependent	of	each	other.	There	are	other	ways	one	might	formalize	
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modellers,	in	response,	point	to	the	empirical	fruitfulness	of	their	ap-
proach.	Where	one	side	emphasizes	statistical	testing,	the	other	points	
to	the	use	of	“natural	experiments”	(Diamond	&	Robinson	2010).	So,	
competition	theorists	approach	an	ecosystem	by	positing	a	set	of	tro-
phic	interactions	between	populations	in	that	ecosystem:	patterns	of	
abundance	are	explained	in	light	of	interactions	between,	for	instance,	
predators	and	prey.	As	evidence,	they	cite	those	population-level	pat-
terns	 themselves,	and	 less	direct	evidence	 from	a	variety	of	 sources	
which	 suggest	 that,	 in	 effect,	 such	patterns	 are	often	due	 to	 trophic	
interactions.	In	response,	“neutral	modellers”	demand	it	be	shown	that	
those	same	patterns	cannot	be	generated	by	models	which	do	not	pos-
it	trophic	interactions.	We	think	this	debate	is	plausibly	read	as	a	de-
mand	for	sharpness	on	the	part	of	the	neutral	theorists,	and	a	defence	
of	variety-of-evidence	reasoning	from	competition	theorists.
Third,	 defenders	 of	 Evidence-Based	Medicine	 are	 plausibly	 read	
as	demanding	sharpness,	and	denying	the	value	of	independence,	in	
the	 context	 of	 approving	medicinal	 treatments.	On	 such	 views,	 the	
best	evidence	(sometimes,	in	effect,	the	only	admissible	evidence)	for	
proving	 the	 effectiveness	of	 a	 treatment	 is	 a	 randomised	 controlled	
trial	and,	ideally,	a	meta-analysis	of	such	trials.	These	are	contrasted	
with	anecdotal,	narrative,	and	lab-based	mechanistic	types	of	evidence	
which	are	 considered	 less	 important.	Others	 respond	 that	medicine	
would	do	better	to	take	a	“total	evidence	view”,	including	these	other	
evidence	sources	in	approving	medical	treatments	(for	general	discus-
sion,	 see	 Stagenga	 2011,	 Solomon	 2015).	 Here,	 the	 evidence-based-
medicine	folk	appear	to	be	demanding	a	certain	sharpness,	while	their	
detractors	think	that	independence	matters	too.
To	show	whether	our	distinction	really	captures	these	debates	and	
others	like	it,	of	course,	would	require	significantly	more	argument	on	
our	part.	The	point	of	this	tour	is	to	provide	some	preliminary	reason	
to	think	that	the	sharpness/independence	distinction	has	some	claim	
to	plausibility	in	practice.	In	what	follows,	we’ll	contrast	two	features	
which	might	make	a	difference	 to	 such	debates.	 First,	 there	 is	what	
we’ll	 call	 “evidential	 context”	—	understood	 narrowly	 as	 concerning	
In	 our	 model,	 we	 will	 distinguish	 between	 two	 scientific	 strate-
gies:	 one	 attempts	 to	maximize	 sharpness,	 the	 other	 independence.	
The	former	strategy	is	 followed	by	methodological obligates:	 they	seek	
out	sources	that	generate	maximally	sharp	evidence.	The	latter	is	fol-
lowed	by	methodological omnivores:	they	seek	to	minimize	the	overlap	
in	background	theory	between	the	evidence	they	have.13	Clearly,	these	
strategies	are	major	simplifications	of	actual	science;	the	distinction	is	
drawn	for	the	purposes	of	modelling.	However,	we	do	think	that	some	
differences	in	scientific	methodology	do	reflect	the	obligate/omnivore	
distinction.
First,	scientists	interested	in	uncovering	the	past	often	emphasize	
the	need	to	“do	science	differently”	in	the	face	of	a	lack	of	experimen-
tal	access	to	their	targets	and	the	decay	of	past	information	(see,	for	
instance,	 the	 introduction	 to	Diamond	&	Robinson	2010,	as	well	as	
Turner	2007).	 In	 light	of	 this,	 the	extent	 to	which	one	can	rely	on	a	
single	or	a	few	sources	of	evidence	dramatically	diminishes:	scientists	
instead	 adopt	 a	 “variety-of-reasoning”	 strategy	which	 seeks	 to	maxi-
mize	 their	 epistemic	 reach.	 Philosophical	 accounts	 of	 historical	 rea-
soning	often	emphasize	the	importance	of	independence	in light of	a	
lack	of	access	to	sharp	evidence.	Because,	in	such	contexts,	evidence	
is	often	ambiguous,	biased,	and	degraded	(in	our	 terminology,	dull), 
scientists	weave	together	several	independent	evidence	sources	(see,	
in	particular,	Currie	2016,	2018;	Wylie	2011,	Chapman	&	Wylie	2016;	
Forber	&	Griffith	2011;	Vezér	2016).
Second,	ecologists	are	often	worried	about	the	legitimacy	of	their	
evidential	practices	(for	a	classic	example,	see	Weiner	1997).	As	Wil-
liam	Bausman	has	recently	discussed	(Bausman	2016,	under	review;	
Bausman	 &	 Halina	 forthcoming),	 “neutral	 theorists”	 complain	 that	
ecological	 methodologies	 which	 focus	 on	 competition	 models	 are	
epistemically	inadequate,	because	they	lack	the	crucial	tests	provided	
by	 null	models.	 They	 argue	 that	models	 without	 competition	 (neu-
tral	models)	should	be	used	to	test	competition	models.	Competition	
13.	 The	obligate/omnivore	distinction	is	adapted	from	Currie	(2015,	2018).
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reasonable,	the	model	is	not	predictive.	Nonetheless,	in	the	best	sce-
nario,	 it	can	serve	as	a	 template	 for	predictive	hypotheses,	once	the	
relevant	data	have	been	gathered.	In	this	capacity,	it	can	also	serve	as	
a	guide	to	data	collection,	prioritising	some	data-gathering	activities	
over	others.	Further,	the	concretisation	that	model-building	provides	
allows	us	to	see	how	our	ideas	might	interact,	thus	revealing	important	
connections	between	them.	
A	useful	way	of	approaching	questions	about	diversity	in	science	
co-opts	 landscape	 models	 from	 evolutionary	 biology.14	 A	 standard	
evolutionary landscape	 consists	of	 three	dimensions,	X,	Y,	 and	Z. X	
and	Y	form	a	two-dimensional	grid:	locations	representing	genotypes.	
A	third	dimension	—	Z — adds	a	topography	to	this	grid,	representing	
the	fitness	of	various	genotypes.	Agents	explore	the	landscape	accord-
ing	 to	various	rules.	 In	evolutionary	 landscapes,	agents	are	 typically	
“hill-climbers”,	shifting	from	lower	to	higher	locations	on	the	grid.	This	
is	 useful	 for	 representing,	 for	 instance,	 local	 fitness	 traps:	 an	 agent	
may	reach	local	optima	but,	due	to	“valleys”,	be	unable	to	reach	higher	
ground.15
Philosophers	 and	 sociologists	 of	 science	 have	 reconceived	 such	
landscapes	in	epistemic terms.	Typically	(following	Weisberg	&	Mul-
doon	2009,	see	also	Grim	2009;	Grim	at	al	2013;	Alexander	et	al	2015;	
Thoma	2015)	locations	on	the	X,	Y	grid	represent	topics that	a	scientist	
might	decide	to	pursue,	while	the	Z	axis	represents	the	significance	of	
a	result	—	i.e.	the	local	optima	might	represent	a	publication	in	a	top	
journal.	In	this	context,	philosophers	have	asked	which	search	strate-
gies	 are	more	 likely	 to	 locate	 peaks	 in	 the	 landscape:	 typically	 “fol-
lower’	strategies,	which	piggyback	on	already	explored	locations,	are	
contrasted	with	“maverick”	strategies,	which	prefer	unexplored	areas.
14.	 Wright	(1932)
15.	 Though	see	Gavrilets	(2004)	for	criticism	of	this	use,	stemming	from	the	per-
nicious	simplifying	use	of	low	(two)	dimensions	to	represent	a	high-dimen-
sionality	 space.	We	note	 that	 this	 criticism	doesn’t	bite	 as	 strongly	 for	our	
model,	since	our	agents	are	not	local	hill-climbers,	as	described	below.
the	effectiveness	of	those	strategies	given	the	nature	of	the	target	sys-
tems	involved,	the	available	evidence,	and	so	forth.	Second,	there	are	
the	beliefs	and	values	of	the	epistemic	community	at	hand.	We	aim	for	
our	model	to	explore	how	a	community’s	beliefs	can	shape	both	the	
kind	of	evidence	generated,	and	the	variety	and	productivity	of	 that	
community.	An	upshot	of	this	discussion	is	the	reminder	that	debates	
about	evidence	do	not	occur	in	a	social	vacuum:	understanding	why	
scientists	approve	of	what	 they	do,	and	how	 they	progress,	 is	not	a	
simple	matter	of	considering	the	appropriate	strategy	given	an	eviden-
tial	context.	Social	factors	matter	—	crucially	—	as	well.
3. Modelling Method Pluralism
Here	is	not	the	place	for	a	full	defence	of	the	use	of	agent-based	mod-
els	 in	 institutional	design,	but	we’ll	make	a	 few	observations	before	
discussing	our	model.	If,	as	we	argue,	method	bias	is	a	real	phenome-
non	with	serious	real-world	implications,	this	paper	could	form	part	of	
an	agenda	calling	for	the	redesign	of	various	scientific	institutions	af-
fected	by	this	bias	(e.g.	publishing	and	funding	institutions).	But	how	
does	such	simulation	work	feed	into	such	agendas?	We’ll	by	and	large	
follow	Roth	(2002)	and	Alexandrova	&	Northcott	(2009)’s	discussions.
The	model	presented	in	this	paper	is	driven	not	by	empirical	data,	
but	 by	 idealised	 representations	 of	 “reasonable	 assumptions”	 about	
the	target	domain.	Therefore,	it	may	be	useful	to	think	of	the	model	as	
a	formalised	thought	experiment.	Both	thought	experiments	and	our	
model	operate	by	making	a	complex	system	“concrete”	(in	the	sense	
of	specific,	not	in	the	sense	of	actual).	However,	unlike	thought	experi-
ments,	which	concretise	by	loading	a	hypothetical	anecdote	with	what	
are	 taken	 to	 be	 exemplary	 characteristics,	 the	model	 concretises	 by	
assigning	numerical	parameters	to	what	are	taken	to	be	key	processes.
In	 the	 design	 of	 the	model,	 the	 usefulness	 of	 the	 concretisation	
relies	 on	 our	 judgements	 of	what	 is	 reasonable	 and	what	 is	 impor-
tant.	The	designer’s	judgement	is	called	upon	twice:	in	the	choice	of	
relevant	processes,	and	in	their	numerical	parametrisation.	Due	to	its	
reliance	on	largely	untested	beliefs	about	what	is	relevant	and	what	is	
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ods	 are,	 the	more	 independent	 their	 evidence	outputs	will	 be	 from	
each	other,	 i.e.	 less	 shared	background	 theory	goes	 into	 linking	 the	
evidence	streams	to	a	hypothesis.19	The	basic	idea	is	that	obligate	and	
omnivore	 agents	 pursue	 research	 programs	preferring	 sharpness	 or	
independence.	 By	manipulating	 landscape	 topography	 and	 publish-
ing	requirements,	we	can	examine	the	relationship	between	method-
ological	strategy,	epistemic	situation,	and	method	bias.	
What	do	we	take	our	model	to	be	a	model	of?	At	minimum,	a	popu-
lation	of	scientists	are	interested	in	which	evidential	sources	and	tests	
will	lead	them	to	the	truth	concerning	some	particular	hypothesis	or	
set	of	hypotheses.	One	group	of	 scientists	—	the	obligates	—	bet	 that	
sharp	 evidence	 is	 the	way	 to	 go,	while	 another	—	omnivores	—	seek	
out	independence.20	Our	model	captures	a	set	of	minimal	conditions	
for	when	 two	different	 features	of	 evidence	might	matter	within	an	
investigation.	One	way	of	 capturing	 these	minimal	 conditions	 is	 by	
gradual	(such	that	overlap	of	background	knowledge,	or	amount	of	screening,	
can	vary	along	a	spectrum),	we	can	associate,	for	a	given	hypothesis	(or	set	
of	mutually	inconsistent	hypotheses)	the	degree	of	independence	with	a	dis-
tance	metric,	and	use	it	to	map	various	evidential	sources	onto	a	landscape.	
We	use	this	property	 in	the	simulations	that	 follow,	and	our	results	should	
hold	 for	 any	 conceptualisation	 of	 independence	 that	 allows	 associating	 a	
distance	metric	 to	a	 collection	of	 evidence	 instances	or	 sources,	vis-à-vis	 a	
hypothesis	under	consideration.
19.	 Given	this	notion	of	distance	we	also	chose	a	bounded,	non-toroidal	topol-
ogy	for	our	model.
20.	We	can	view	this	situation	through	Bayesian	eyes.	There’s	a	set	of	hypotheses	
under	consideration,	and	a	range	of	evidential	sources	which	could	provide	
confirmation	of	one	hypothesis	against	others.	We	care	about	two	properties	
of	 evidence	 in	 relation	 to	 the	hypothesis	 set.	One	 is	 a	direct	 confirmation	
relationship	that	maps	an	evidence	source	and	a	hypothesis	set	to	a	degree	
of	confirmation	for	the	best-supported	hypothesis	in	the	set	f1 (e,{h})→c (hbest).	
The	other	is	a	relational	confirmation	relationship	that	maps	a	set	of	evidence	
sources	 and	 a	hypothesis	 set	 to	 a	 degree	of	 confirmation	 for	 the	best-sup-
ported	hypothesis	in	the	set	f2 ({e},{h})→c(hbest).	In	our	model	we	cash	these	
out	 in	 terms	of	 sharpness	 and	 independence	 respectively,	but	our	 simulation	
results	 should	hold	 for	 any	way	of	 factoring	 the	 confirmation	 relationship	
into	two	complementary	relationships,	one	that	esmphasizes	the	direct	link	
between	an	evidence	source	and	a	hypothesis,	and	the	other	that	emphasizes	
the	relations	between	evidence	sources	(all	of	this,	of	course,	should	take	into	
account	general-	and	evidence-source-specific	background	knowledge).
In	 our	 case,	we’re	 interested	 in	 a	 different	 set	 of	 questions:	 first,	
the	relationship	between	epistemic	situation	and	evidence-gathering	
strategy;	 second,	 the	 relationship	between	evidence	generation	and	
method	bias.	As	such,	our	model	differs	from	previous	work	both	in	
terms	of	its	dynamics	—	as	we’ll	see,	these	are	more	complex	—	and	in	
terms	of	construal.	Where	X,	Y	coordinates	represent	topics	for	Weis-
berg	&	Muldoon,	 for	us	 they	represent	methods:	particular	 investiga-
tive	techniques.	Where	the	Z	axis	previously	represented	significance,	
we’ll	take	it	to	mean	sharpness,	such	that	the	height	of	each	location	
is	the	sharpness	of	the	evidence	produced	by	that	particular	method.	
Further,	distance	between	X,	Y	coordinates	 in	our	model	 represents	
the	 overlap	 between	 background	 theory	 which	 underwrites	 meth-
ods	—	that	is,	independence.
A	 common	 criticism	 of	 existing	 epistemic	 landscape	 models	 is	
that	 neither	 height	 of	 individual	 points	 on	 the	 landscape	 nor	 dis-
tance	between	points	on	 the	 landscape	have	 rigorous	philosophical	
underpinnings.16	 In	our	model,	both	of	 these	parameters	are	clearer.	
Each	 parameter	 (height	 and	 distance)	maps	 directly	 to	 the	 goals	 of	
obligates	 and	 omnivores	 respectively,	 namely	 sharpness	 (degree	 of	
belief	update	following	evidence)	and	independence	(degree	of	infor-
mation	overlap	between	two	different	kinds	of	evidence,	given	back-
ground	knowledge).17	As	such,	we	conceive	of	each	location,	given	by	
a	 specified	 (x, y)	 coordinate,	 as	 representing	 a	method	 of	 data	 gen-
eration,	and	of	landscape	“height”	(Z axis)	as	evidence	sharpness:	the	
higher	the	point,	 the	sharper	the	evidence	produced	by	the	method,	
given	 background	 knowledge.	 Distance	 in	 the	 landscape	—	on	 the	
X,	Y	plane	—	represents	 independence:18	 the	 further	 apart	 two	meth-
16.	 See	criticism	of	current	 lack	of	 solid	 foundations	 in	Avin	(2015),	ch.	2.	See	
Avin	(2015),	ch.	3,	for	an	attempt	to	provide	such	a	foundation.
17.	 Though	 note	 possible	 complications	 arising	 from	 the	 subjective	 nature	 of	
background	belief	and	belief	update,	as	noted	in	footnote	8,	and	from	various	
interpretations	of	independence,	as	noted	in	footnote	12.
18.	 As	long	as	the	conceptualisation	of	independence	takes	the	form	of	a	three-
way	relationship,	or	more	generally	an	(n+1)-way	relationship	for	a	hypoth-
esis	and	n	instances	of	evidence,	and	as	long	as	independence	is	taken	to	be	
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explore	the	effects	of	method	mismatch	and	method	bias.	The	values	
which	determine,	for	instance,	agent	behaviour	are	therefore	not	arbi-
trary,	at	least	in	this	minimal	sense.
Let’s	highlight	some	model	features	one-by-one.22
Landscape values
We	utilize	the	three	dimensions	of	the	landscape	(distance	along	the	X	
dimension,	distance	along	the	Y	dimension,	and	height	along	the	Z	di-
mension)	to	represent	the	two	distinct	qualities	of	evidence	discussed	
above:	sharpness	and	independence.	Our	landscape	is	dynamic,	with	
sharpness	values	allowed	to	vary	over	the	course	of	the	simulation.	
The	Z	axis	(sharpness)	of	a	landscape	consists	in	both	a	potential	
value	or	“ceiling”	and	an	actual	value.	At	the	beginning	of	a	simulation	
run,	the	potential	value	is	created	by	adding	randomly	shaped	bivari-
ate	Gaussians	to	a	flat	 landscape.	The	initial	actual	value	is	 then	set	
to	 some	 fraction	of	 the	potential	 value.	By	 “generating”	 (see	below),	
agents	can	increase	the	exploitable	landscape	to	above	the	initial	ac-
tual	 values,	but	 it	 can	exceed	 the	 ceiling	only	under	 special	 circum-
stances.23	When	agents	“exploit”	(see	below),	 the	actual	value	along	
the	Z	axis	decreases.	When	the	actual	value	of	sharpness	changes,	it	
changes	for	all	agents	in	the	model;	there	is	only	one	unchanging	“po-
tential”	landscape	throughout	the	simulation	and,	at	any	given	simula-
tion	step,	only	one	“actual”	landscape,	which	are	shared	by	all	agents.
In	 addition	 to	 sharpness	—	the	Z	 value	—	we’re	 also	 interested	 in	
independence.	This	is	roughly	the	distance	between	two	locations	on	
the	X,	Y	grid.	Distance	is	an	infamous	source	of	trouble	for	landscape	
models.24	In	evolutionary	models,	it	is	plausibly	read	as	similarity	be-
tween	genotypes;	 in	epistemic	models,	 similarity	between	 investiga-
tions	or	 techniques.	But	 in	what	 sense	are	genotypes	or	 techniques	
22.	 Both	 the	 model’s	 code	 and	 an	 expanded	 explanation	 of	 the	 model’s	 vari-
ables	and	operation	can	be	found	online	at	https://github.com/shaharavin/
method-bias/.
23.	 If	two	peaks	overlap,	the	total	value	can	exceed	the	ceiling.
24.	 Stadler	et	al	(2001),	Avin	(2015,	ch.	3).
appealing	to	the	Kuhnian	notion	of	normal science.	That	is,	our	model	
captures	circumstances	where	there	is	more-or-less	agreement	about	
what	hypotheses	matter,	how	evidence	effects	those	hypotheses,	and	
so	on.21 
As	mentioned	above,	our	landscape	is	a	three-dimensional	configu-
ration	space.	Agents	interact	with	the	landscape,	generating	evidence	
and	publishing	their	results.	Agents	are	distinguished	by	how	they	do	
so:	obligates	prefer	 to	pursue	sharpness,	and	will	publish	when	suf-
ficient	sharpness	is	reached;	omnivores	will	prefer	independence,	and	
will	publish	when	they	collect	a	body	of	evidence	that	spans	a	suffi-
ciently	diverse	background.	We	can	represent	method	bias	by	manipu-
lating	publishing	requirements.	
The	model	 is	evolutionary:	after	set	 time	periods,	 the	ratio	of	ob-
ligates	 to	 omnivores	 is	 altered,	with	 some	 agents	 “defecting”	 to	 the	
“winning”	strategy,	where	“winning”	is	determined	by	the	number	of	
publications	attributed	to	each	strategy.	We	don’t	mean	for	these	evo-
lutionary	dynamics	to	represent	the	development	of	actual	scientific	
communities	over	time.	Rather,	the	revealed	evolutionary	trajectories	
show	how	different	publishing	requirements	and	landscape	topogra-
phies	favour	different	research	strategies.
In	designing	the	model,	we	ran	calibration	simulations	which	ex-
plored	ranges	of	reasonable	parameter	values	to	find	combinations	of	
landscape	 topography,	 agent	 strategies,	 and	 publication	 thresholds	
that	 consistently	 result	 in	 landscapes	where	both	obligates	 and	om-
nivores	survive	in	dynamic	equilibrium	near	a	50%/50%	population	
split.	We	 used	 these	 parameter	 configurations	 to	 establish	 “neutral”	
landscapes	 and	 publication	 thresholds	 that	 we	 could	 then	 vary	 to	
21.	 More	explicitly,	we	take	a	straightforward	model	interpretation	to	require	(1)	
general	community	agreement	about	the	hypothesis	set	under	consideration	
{h},	(2)	an	a posteriori	agreement	about	the	admissible	evidence	set	{e}	(this	
is	a posteriori because	evidential	sources	are	initially	unknown	to	the	commu-
nity	members,	but	we	require	that,	once	a	method	is	discovered,	its	results	
are	accepted	as	evidence	by	the	knowledge	gatekeepers	of	the	community),	
and	(3)	agreement	within	each	sub-community	pursuing	one	of	f
1	
or	f
2	
about	
their	values	(which	can	be	cached	out,	for	example,	by	demanding	agreement	
about	the	background	knowledge	required	for	each	evidence	source).	
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Exploration
In	 the	model,	each	agent	 tracks	 their	own	 “vision”,	 representing	 the	
methods	each	scientist	knows	about	and	can	deploy	to	generate	evi-
dence;	vision	is	not	shared	between	agents.	At	a	simulation	run’s	be-
ginning,	each	agent’s	vision	is	restricted	to	a	radius	around	their	 ini-
tial	position.25	When	an	agent	 explores, they	 shift	 their	position	 to	a	
random	unexplored	spot	on	the	landscape	(allowing	“hopping”)	and	
update	their	vision.	We	can	imagine	exploration	as	a	set	of	quite	dis-
parate	scientific	activities:	literature	reviews,	field	work,	and	so	forth.	
As	the	simulation	proceeds,	agents	uncover	increasing	amounts	of	the	
landscape.	Agents	never	lose	vision	of	previously	explored	areas,	and	
can	“see”	changes	to	sharpness	caused	by	other	agents	(see	below).
Exploitation
Exploitation	 mines	 evidence	 from	 the	 landscape.	 Agents	 are	 unre-
stricted	spatially	—	they	can	exploit	any	visible	(to	them)	spot	on	the	
landscape.	On	exploitation	an	agent	scans	known	locales	and	selects	
the	best	spot	according	to	their	strategy	(see	below).	Once	a	spot	 is	
selected,	 the	evidence	 for	 that	position	—	its	 sharpness	and	 location	
(which	affects	independence)	—	is	added	to	the	agent’s	evidence	stack.	
Exploitation	also	changes	 topography	 to	reflect	both	diminishing	re-
turns	in	evidential	sharpness	and	loss	of	novelty.	The	actual	height	of	
the	position	is	decreased	by	a	fixed	fraction	of	the	ceiling.	Note	that	
reduction	is	shallow and	surgical:	the	landscape	doesn’t	reduce	com-
pletely,	and	the	surrounding	landscape	is	more-or-less	unscathed.	We	
can	 imagine	exploitation	as	 scientists	producing	data:	analysing	 fos-
sils,	say,	or	running	an	experiment.
Generation
Scientists	do	not	simply	run	experiments;	they	also	must	design	them.	
Palaeontologists	do	not	only	analyse	fossils;	they	must	find	them,	and	
25.	We	used	a	radius	of	5	for	vision	updates,	using	Moore	neighborhood	(all	grid	
locations	within	distance	5	and	within	the	grid’s	bounds).
similar;	 and	 is	 this	 similarity	 reasonably	 represented	 in	 two	 dimen-
sions?	On	our	construal,	distance	is	a	measure	not	of	similarity,	but	of	
overlap	between	background	theories	which	underwrite	methods.	We	
don’t	doubt	that	there	is	much	more	to	be	said	in	working	out	precise-
ly	what	this	amounts	to,	but	insofar	as	it	relies	on	a	notion	of	overlap	
rather	than	similarity,	it	is,	we	think,	an	improvement.
So,	distance	is	conceived	as	a	measure	of	independence:	methods	
close	to	each	other	in	the	landscape	have	significant	overlap	in	back-
ground	theory,	while	those	far	apart	have	less	overlap.	When	extend-
ing	 from	distance,	 a	 two-way	 relationship,	 to	an	N-way	 relationship,	
we	measure	the	independence	of	a	set	of	methods	as	the	area	of	the	
polygon	bounding	 the	coordinates	corresponding	 to	 these	methods.	
An	important	variable	regarding	distance	is	the	clustering of	peaks.	An	
initial	variable	determines	to	what	extent	peaks	are	distributed	with-
in	 the	 landscape:	high	values	 lead	 to	peaks	 clustering	 in	 the	 centre,	
such	that	the	area	of	the	polygon	bounding	the	highest	peaks	is	small	
relative	to	the	size	of	the	landscape	(low	independence);	low	values	
of	clustering	lead	to	a	wider	distribution	of	peaks,	a	larger	bounding	
polygon,	and	higher	 independence.	Unlike	sharpness,	 the	degree	of	
independence	of	different	methods	(the	X	and	Y	coordinates	of	meth-
ods)	remains	fixed	throughout	the	simulation;	however,	as	sharpness	
varies,	sometimes	a	method	becomes	so	dull	(“0”	sharpness)	that	it	is	
no	longer	worth	pursuing,	at	which	point	it	would	not	contribute	to	
independence,	 and	 so	 the	potential	 for	 generating	 independent	 evi-
dence	on	the	landscape	changes	over	time	even	as	distances	remain	
fixed.	
Agent behaviours
At	the	beginning	of	the	simulation,	agents	are	seeded	on	the	landscape	
in	random	locations.	Each	turn,	agents	perform	one	of	four	behaviours,	
and	an	agent’s	strategy	(omnivore	or	obligate)	dictates	how	likely	they	
are	to	perform	each	behaviour.	If	a	behaviour	is	selected	that	the	agent	
cannot	 perform	 that	 turn,	 they	 select	 a	 new	behaviour	with	 the	un-
available	behaviour	removed.	Let’s	examine	each	behaviour.
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Obligates are	scientists	who	value	sharpness:	they	are	less	likely	to	
look	for	different	kinds	of	evidence,	but	instead	prefer	to	focus	on	de-
veloping	a	promising	area.	Their	bar	for	publication	is	determined	by	
the	 total sharpness of	 their	 stack	of	evidence.	 In	 the	first	experiment,	
this	is	when	the	sum	of	the	evidence	sharpness	is	greater	than	three	
times	the	landscape’s	ceiling.	They	generate	and	exploit	twice	as	often	
as	 they	 submit,	 and	 explore	only	half	 as	 often	 as	 they	 submit.	This	
represents	the	kind	of	reasoning	we	see	in	much	experimental	science:	
careful,	controlled	studies	are	the	focus.	Obligates	select	the	highest	
visible	peak	when	exploiting.
Table	 1	Agent	 strategies	 and	associated	behaviour	 likelihoods	
and	publication	criteria
Explore
Prob.
Generate
Prob.
Exploit
Prob.
Submit
Prob.
Publish 
(in 1st and 
2nd experi-
ment)
Obligate 1 / 11 4 / 11 4 / 11 2 / 11 Total 
evidence 
sharpness 
> 3x the 
ceiling
Omnivore 2 / 5 1 / 5 1 / 5 1 / 5 Polygon 
area of 
evidence 
> 1/5 
landscape 
area
Simulation Runs
At	the	beginning	of	a	simulation,	various	initial	parameters	are	set,	in-
cluding	agent	number,	landscape	size,	and	so	forth.	Agents	are	seeded,	
and	each	performs	one	action	per	turn	(unless	they	have	generated,	at	
which	point	no	action	is	taken	for	six	turns).	At	the	end	of	an	episode	
produce	new	methods	for	doing	so.	Generation	is	a	way	of	modelling	
this	activity.	When	an	agent	generates,	actual	landscape	value	increas-
es	both	at	their	current	position	and	at	a	randomly	selected	spot.	The	
extra	spot	is	to	represent	the	indirect	upshots	of	new	techniques.	The	
two	peaks	are	both	generated	at	the	potential	value	of	their	respective	
locations.	Generation	is	time-consuming,	but	agents	get	first	dibs	on	
accessing	the	fruits	of	their	labour	—	after	generation	is	complete,	the	
agent	immediately	exploits.
Submission
Once	an	agent’s	evidence	stack	meets	a	certain	threshold	(threshold	
is	strategy-dependent	—	see	below),	they	are	able	to	submit	their	evi-
dence	for	publication.	The	submitting	agent’s	evidence	stack	is	cleared,	
and	a	new	publication	with	 that	evidence	emerges.	The	publication	
records	both	which	agent	produced	 it	and	 the	strategy	of	 the	agent.	
Publication	quantity	per	strategy	determines	the	ratio	of	strategies	at	
the	beginning	of	the	next	episode	(see	below).	
Agent strategies
Agents	adopt	one	of	two	strategies,	defined	by	how	likely	they	are	to	
perform	actions	(their	weighting),	and	by	the	sufficiency	conditions	for	
publication.	
Omnivores	are	scientists	who	value	independent	evidence:	they	are	
likely	to	seek	out	new	methods,	techniques,	and	data	sources,	and	this	
is	reflected	in	their	tendency	to	prefer	exploration.	Their	bar	for	pub-
lication	submission	is	determined	by	the	independence	of	their	stack	
of	evidence.	In	the	first	experiment,	they	may	publish	once	the	area	of	
the	bounding	polygon	of	their	evidence	stack	is	greater	than	or	equal	
to	1/5	of	the	landscape	area	(the	X,	Y	dimensions).	They	are	twice	as	
likely	to	explore	as	they	are	to	generate,	exploit,	or	submit.	This	rep-
resents	 “variety-of-evidence”	 reasoning.	When	an	omnivore	exploits,	
they	select	locations	which	are	maximally	distant	from	the	locations	
in	their	evidence	stack	(so	long	as	that	location	has	at	least	some	non-
zero	value	in	terms	of	sharpness).
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Figure	1.	Snapshots	of	a	sample	simulation	run.	X-	and	Y-axes	
map	 to	 landscape	 coordinates,	 and	 colours	 represent	
height	(from	dark	blue,	which	is	lowest,	to	dark	red,	which	
is	highest).	The	locations	where	agents	exploit	are	marked	
on	 the	 landscape	as	well,	with	black	dots	 for	obligate	ex-
ploitation	and	white	dots	 for	omnivore	 exploitation.	The	
series	shows	the	landscape	dynamics	following	generation	
and	exploitation.	
4. Experiments: Topography & Strategy
The	literature	on	methodological	pluralism	implies	that	caring	about	
independence	or	sharpness	—	that	 is,	adopting	omnivore	or	obligate	
strategies	—	is	 in	 part	 a	 response	 to	 epistemic	 situation. We	 can	 un-
derstand	an	epistemic	situation	as	concerning,	first,	an	evidential	con-
text	—	that	is,	the	kinds	of	evidence	sources	which	are	available	—	and,	
second,	a	broader	set	of	social	influences.	Our	landscape	is	intended	to	
represent	the	former	(we	examine	the	latter	by	shifting	publication	re-
quirements	in	the	next	section).	Obligates	should	flourish	when	there	
are	rich	seams	of	evidence	to	exploit	(clustered,	tall	peaks),	while	om-
nivores	should	do	well	when	the	epistemic	landscape	is	more	diffuse	
and	sparse.	We	ran	 two	experiments	 to	establish	 that,	 in	our	model,	
the	success	of	a	strategy	is	sensitive	to	landscape	topography,	which	
reasonably	represents	evidential	context.
Experiment 1: Abundance
What’s	the	relationship	between	total	landscape	abundance	(that	is,	the	
sum	of	 heights	 of	 all	 landscape	 coordinates)	 and	whether	 the	 land-
scape	 favours	obligate	or	omnivore	 strategies?	A	 circumstance	with	
bountiful,	 sharp	 evidence	 should	 encourage	 scientists	 to	 focus	 on	
sharpness.	When	evidence	is	duller,	a	strategy	of	focusing	on	variety-
of-evidence	reasoning	is	more	appropriate.	And	indeed,	in	our	model,	
increasing	abundance	 leads	 to	higher	obligate	 favouring,	and	 lower	
abundance	leads	to	higher	omnivore	favouring	(see	fig	2).
(which	is	a	set	number	of	turns),	the	ratio	of	omnivores	to	obligates	is	
updated	to	reflect	the	relative	success	of	each	strategy	in	publishing	
papers.	We	take	a	turn	to	represent	three	months	of	research:	a	very	
coarse	estimate	of	a	field-season	or	an	experimental	run.	
Figure	1	shows	a	series	of	snapshots	from	a	sample	simulation	run.	
Variations	in	colour	indicate	landscape	values,	with	the	blue	end	of	the	
spectrum	representing	low	values,	and	red	high.	Between	snapshots,	
exploitation	leads	to	reduction	in	local	sharpness	(less	red,	more	blue),	
while	generation	leads	to	increases	in	sharpness.	Locations	obligates	
exploit	 are	marked	with	 black	 dots	 and	 cluster	 around	 the	 highest	
peaks;	 locations	omnivores	exploit	 are	marked	with	white	dots	and	
tend	to	occur	on	the	periphery	of	the	landscape.
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Experiment 2: Clustering
In	a	further	experiment	on	the	relationship	between	topography	and	
strategy,	we	altered	the	spread	of	value	in	the	landscape.	We	in	effect	
kept	 total	 abundance	 and	 landscape	 ceiling	 steady,26	 but	 varied	 the	
distribution	 of	 value	 across	 the	 landscapes.	We	 predicted	 that	 land-
scapes	with	 concentrated	 value	 at	 or	 near	 the	 centre	would	 favour	
obligates,	while	 landscapes	with	 value	 spread	 across	 the	 landscape	
would	favour	omnivores.	By	manipulating	landscape	clustering	while	
holding	abundance	fixed,	we	thus	examined	the	relationship	between	
how	distributed	evidence	is,	and	the	success	of	strategies	(fig	3)
...
Figure	3:	Omnivore	ratio	as	a	function	of	peak	clustering.
26.	There	is	some	variation	due	to	peak	overlaps.
Figure	2:	Plot	of	omnivore	ratio	relative	to	the	total	population	
at	 simulation	 end	 (after	 150	 steps),	 as	 a	 function	of	 total	
landscape	 abundance,	 averaged	over	 50	 runs	 (error	 bars	
show	one	standard	deviation).
Figure	2	represents	fifty	simulation	runs	per	value	of	total	landscape	
abundance.	The	vertical	axis	represents	the	ratio	of	omnivores	to	the	
total	population;	the	horizontal	axis	represents	landscape	abundance.	
There	is	a	clear	pattern:	landscapes	of	low	abundance	are	dominated	
by	omnivores;	at	higher	values,	obligates	are	favoured.	These	results	
are	reason	to	think	that	our	model	is	behaving	as	it	should:	sharpness-
rich	circumstances	encourage	obligate	strategies.
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of	 publishing	 for	 the	 various	 strategies	 (irrelevant	 of	 topography).	
Whether	bias	is	egregious,	indifferent,	or	positive	is	not	built	into	our	
model	—	this	depends	on	context	and	the	goals	at	hand.
Experiment 3: Method Bias
We	know	that	certain	 landscapes	 favour	certain	strategies:	clustered,	
abundant	 landscapes	 favour	obligates;	dispersed,	 sparse	 landscapes	
favour	omnivores.	Can	method	bias,	 here	 in	 its	 guise	of	 publishing	
standards,	 work	 against	 or	 mitigate	 the	 strategies	 favoured	 by	 the	
landscape?	 To	 answer	 this,	 we	 conducted	 a	 series	 of	 experiments	
where	 the	publishing	 requirements	 for	 one	 strategy	were	 increased	
while	those	for	the	other	remained	steady.
In	the	experiment	below,	we	track	omnivore	ratio	against	an	om-
nivore	publishing	bias	in	a	landscape	which	highly	favours	obligates	
(high	clustering	and	abundance).	Low	values	on	the	horizontal	axis	
represent	low	standards	for	omnivore	publishing	—	roughly,	the	lower	
the	value,	the	easier	it	is	for	omnivores	to	publish.	
Figure	4:	Omnivore	ratio	as	a	function	of	omnivore	publication	
threshold	on	an	obligate-favouring	landscape.
Again,	in	the	figure,	the	vertical	axis	represents	omnivore	ratio	to	the	
total	population	at	the	end	of	the	simulation.	The	horizontal	axis	rep-
resents	clustering,	where	low	values	place	no	restriction	on	initial	peak	
placement,	and	higher	values	increasingly	restrict	peaks	to	the	centre	
of	the	landscape.	We	ran	fifty	simulations	for	each	value	of	the	cluster-
ing	parameter	shown	in	the	figure.	Sure	enough,	increasing	clustering	
favoured	obligates,	and	lowering	it	favoured	omnivores.
5. Experiments: Bias
The	first	two	experiments	established	the	relationship	between	strat-
egy	success	and	landscape	topography.	In	effect,	this	shows	that	our	
model	behaves	as	it	ought:	landscapes	with	abundant,	sharp,	clustered	
evidence	favour	obligates;	unabundant,	dull,	dispersed	landscapes	fa-
vour	omnivores.	We	construe	this	as	representing	the	kinds	of	differ-
ences	between	sciences	discussed	in	section	2.	Where	some	scientists	
seek	“rich	veins”	of	sharp	evidence,	others	adopt	variety-of-evidence	
reasoning	to	mitigate	the	ambiguity	of	their	data.	Having	established	
that	different	 strategies	were	 favoured	 in	different	 topographies,	we	
now	introduce	publishing	bias	to	see	how	it	affects	favouring.	We	can	
introduce	bias	by	shifting	the	sufficiency	for	publication	in	one	strat-
egy	but	not	another.	Recall	that	epistemic	situations	include	both	evi-
dential	contexts	—	represented	by	the	landscape	—	and	broader	social	
aspects.	We	take	publication	bias	to	coarsely	represent	these	broader	
aspects	—	and	indeed,	our	models	are	 intended	to	show	how	crucial	
these	are.
We	should	disambiguate	 two	ways	 in	which	publishers	might	be	
“unbiased”.	On	the	one	hand,	a	“laissez-faire”	bias	takes	an	unbiased	
publisher	to	go,	as	it	were,	with	the	evidential	context.	They	will	not	
attempt	 to	 interfere	with	 the	 “natural”	 path	 of	 things.	On	 the	 other	
hand,	 a	 “balanced”	 notion	 of	 bias	 understands	 unbiased	 publishers	
as	striving	for	an	even	split	between	strategies.	They	will	sometimes	
work	against the	evidential	context	to	ensure	that	as	close	as	possible	
to	equal	proportions	are	present.	These	differing	conceptions	are	un-
problematic	 for	our	purposes:	 “bias”	 is	 simply	 the	comparative	ease	
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The	lesson	here	is	that	publishing	bias	can	affect	evidence	genera-
tion	in	two	ways.	Firstly,	it	can	maintain	methodologically	mismatched	
strategies	in	a	population	which	would	otherwise	be	eliminated.	Sec-
ondly	—	and	in	virtue	of	this	first	feature	—	it	can	increase	the	amount	
of	evidence	quality	that	is	mismatched	to	the	evidential	context:	bias	
can	 increase	 the	 independence	extracted	 from	abundant	 landscapes,	
or	sharpness	from	diffuse	landscapes.
In	the	above	experiments,	we	have	mitigated	the	context-matching	
advantages	of	the	obligate	by	making	things	easier	for	the	omnivores.	
In	the	next	study,	we	leave	the	omnivores’	publication	thresholds	as	
they	are,	but	make	it	trickier	for	the	obligates.
Figure	6:	Total	independence	as	a	function	of	obligate	publica-
tion	threshold	on	an	obligate-favouring	landscape.
Figure	6	plots	total	independence	(vertical	axis)	against	obligate-bias	
(horizontal	axis)	in	an	obligate-favouring	landscape.	We’ve	seen	above	
that	total	independence	in	this	kind	of	landscape	is	a	good	proxy	for	
In	an	epistemic	 landscape	so	 favouring	of	obligates,	 things	must	be	
made	very easy	to	keep	omnivores	in	the	population.	Even	at	our	high-
est	publishing	bias,	under	¼	of	 the	population	are	omnivores.	How-
ever,	the	bias	does keep	them	in	the	population	—	where,	under	usual	
conditions,	 topography	 would	 exclude	 omnivores,	 diversity	 can	 be	
maintained	using	publishing	bias.	
Further	(and	unsurprisingly),	publishing	bias	can	also	affect	both	
the	amount	of	sharpness	and	independence	extracted	from	a	landscape.
Figure	5:	Total	independence	summed	across	all	publications	as	
a	 function	 of	 omnivore	 publication	 threshold	 on	 an	 obli-
gate-favouring	landscape.
This	graph	charts	omnivore	publishing	bias	on	the	horizontal	axis	(as	
before)	 but	 this	 time	 tracks	 the	 total	 amount	 of	 evidential	 indepen-
dence	on	the	vertical	axis.	The	results	are	remarkably	similar	to	those	
previously	shown	(see	figure	4),	and	this	makes	sense:	as	publishing	
bias	keeps	more	omnivores	in	a	population,	and	those	omnivores	fo-
cus	on	producing	highly	independent	evidence,	we	should	expect	the	
total	population	to	produce	more	independence	of	evidence.
	 adrian	currie	&	shahar	avin Method Pluralism, Method Mismatch, & Method Bias
philosophers’	imprint	 –		16		– vol.	19,	no.	13	(april	2019)
Figure	7:	Total	sharpness	across	all	publications	as	a	function	of	
omnivore	publication	 threshold	on	an	obligate-favouring	
landscape.
The	above	tracks	total	sharpness	(vertical	axis)	against	omnivore	bias	
(horizontal	axis),	again	in	an	obligate-favouring	landscape.	Undoubt-
edly,	the	amount	of	sharpness	extracted	from	a	landscape	decreases	
at	more	extreme	omnivore	publishing	biases	(and	thus	omnivore	ra-
tio,	 and	 total	 independence).	 Interestingly,	 the	 average	 amount	 still	
increases	—	although	not	enormously,	once	error	bars	are	taken	into	
account	—	once	the	bias	is	lowered	to	the	point	where,	in	the	previous	
studies,	 omnivores	 left	 the	 population.	 That	 is,	 the	 previous	 experi-
ments	showed	us	that	at	0.2	there	are	next	to	no	omnivores	in	the	pop-
ulation,	and	yet	the	trend	in	quality	continues	its	upwards	trajectory	to	
0.25.	This	suggests	that	biasing	against	the	mismatched	methodology	
can	have	positive	effects	on	the	context-matching	methodology	—	pre-
sumably	because	it	decreases	the	number	of	“lucky”	omnivores	who	
happen	 to	 hang	on	beyond	 expectations.	 Bias	 can,	 then,	 operate	 in	
both	epistemic	and	strategic	diversity.	We	see	that	there	is	no	discern-
ible	pattern	—	making	things	easier	or	harder	for	the	context-matching	
obligates	doesn’t	seem	to	make	a	systematic	difference	to	the	amount	
of	 independence	 produced.	A	 tempting	 lesson	 to	 draw	 here	 is	 that	
publishing	bias	produces	more	diversity	when	favouring the mismatched 
than	when	disfavouring the matched. As	mentioned	above,	such	conclu-
sions	 are	not	 prescriptive,	 both	because	 the	model	 is	 agnostic	with	
respect	to	the	valence	of	bias,	and	because	it	is	too	idealised	for	direct	
application	to	science	policy.	
Nonetheless,	we	offer	here	a	template	for	a	causal	hypothesis	that	
could	 be	 tested:	 lowering	 evidential	 requirements	 for	 the	 method	
which	 is	 less	 effective	 in	 the	 evidential	 context	 (e.g.	 a	 variety-of-ev-
idence	 paper	 in	 a	 traditional	 experimental-sharpness-oriented	 disci-
pline)	would	have	more	effect	 than	hardening	 the	 requirements	 for	
a	favoured	method.	Though	conceptual	and	methodological	hurdles	
abound,	such	a	hypothesis	could	conceivably	be	put	to	the	test.
Efficiency cost
A	further	question:	what	costs	are	there	in	overall	productivity,	and	in	
terms	of	the	evidence	quality	pursued	by	the	context-matching	strategy	
when	publishing	bias	is	introduced?	
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The	lesson,	we	take	it,	 is	that	although	there	are	costs	associated	
with	 publishing	 bias,	 these	 are	 neither	 simple	 nor	 fair.	 In	 our	mod-
el,	 at	 least,	 the	 introduction	of	bias	against	 the	grain	does	not	have	
equal	 costs	 for	 the	advantaged	value	—	potentially,	 then,	overall	 effi-
ciency	(taking	into	account	both	sharpness	and	independence)	of	the	
community	has	 increased.	Of	course,	 in	our	model	we	have	no	non-
arbitrary	way	of	combining independence	and	sharpness	into	a	single	
measure,	and	so	‘overall	efficiency’	is	not	meaningful	in	that	context.27 
Regardless,	 the	discrepancy	between	 increases	 in	one	value	and	de-
creases	in	the	other	are	suggestive.	If	this	trade-off	can	be	confirmed	
empirically,	 it	 could	support	an	argument	 for	methodological	plural-
ism	in	epistemic	communities	—	there	may	be	diminishing	returns	for	
a	particular	strategy,	and	much	to	be	gained	by	having	at	least	a	small	
number	of	researchers	pursuing	another.
6. Discussion
We’ve	aimed	to	provide	a	systematic	way	of	 thinking	about	method	
pluralism,	to	argue	that	methods	might	not	match	evidential	context,	
and	to	explore	how	bias	can	both	undermine	and	aid	us	in	increasing	
the	efficiency	and	diversity	of	epistemic	communities.	Before	conclud-
ing,	we	want	 to	make	 two	points.	 First,	we’ll	 consider	 the	potential	
downsides	of	method	bias	in	various	contexts.	Second,	we’ll	suggest	
that	consideration	of	method	bias	 should	 lead	us	 to	 think	 that	com-
munity	standards	about	what	good	science	looks	like	are	a	necessary	
component	of	philosophical	explanations	of	scientific	evidence.
Egregious Method Bias
Our	model	 does	 not	 tell	 you	when	method	bias	 is	 egregious	 or	 ad-
vantageous;	 it	only	generates	the	effects	publishing	bias	might	have	
27.	 It	might	be	argued	that	a	lack	of	a	unified	measure	is	problematic,	but	we’re	
not	so	sure.	First,	it’s	unclear	to	us	whether	the	kinds	of	evidence	which	sci-
entists	often	bring	together	are	non-arbitrarily	combined	in	practice.	Second,	
our	focus	is	not	on	the	evidential	value	of	a	landscape	per se,	but	on	how	dif-
ferent	publishing	practices	might	affect	the	make-up	of	populations.	Thanks	
to	Remco	Heesen	for	pushing	us	on	this	point.
both	directions:	it	can	increase	how	focused an	epistemic	community	is,	
by	conspiring	with	the	epistemic	landscape;	or	it	can	increase	diversity, 
by	working	against the	landscape.
Is	 the	 trade-off	 a	 fair	 one?	 That	 is,	when	we	 encourage	 the	mis-
matched	methodology,	do	we	discourage	the	other	in	equal	amounts?	
We	 think	 not	 (and	 this	 is,	 presumably,	 because	 omnivores	 still	 pro-
duce	some	sharpness,	and	obligates	some	independence).	To	draw	a	
comparison,	we	ran	a	series	of	experiments	which	looked	at	a	neutral	
landscape,	an	omnivore-favouring	landscape,	and	an	obligate-favour-
ing	landscape.	The	values	in	the	neutral	landscape	were	used	as	a	met-
ric	against	which	the	others	were	valued.	The	table	below	tracks	the	
results:
Neutral bias Omni bias (for) Obli bias (for)
Neutral 1,1 0.68,1.38 1.72,0.47
Omni-favouring 0.31,1.69 0.31,2.04 0.46,1.54
Obli-favouring 11.37,0.17 9.08,0.38 11.93,0.16
The	first	 value	 represents	 total	 sharpness,	 the	 second	 total	 indepen-
dence.	The	values	are	indexed	to	the	neutral	values.	So,	for	instance,	
the	 score	of	 11.93	 in	 the	obligate-favouring,	obligate	bias	 landscape,	
in	the	bottom	right	corner,	represents	a	nearly	12-fold	increase	in	the	
total	amount	of	sharpness	extracted	from	the	(much	more	abundantly	
sharp)	landscape.	These	results	suggest	that	there	is	not	a	fair	trade-
off	in	such	cases	—	in	fact,	the	cost	paid	in	the	advantaged	value	(the	
property	sought	by	the	context-matched	methodology)	is	less than the	
amount	gained	in	the	disadvantaged	value.	 In	an	obligate-favouring	
landscape,	we	pay	a	 cost	of	20%	reduction	 in	 total	 sharpness	 (from	
11.37	with	no	bias	to	9.08	with	omnivore-favouring	bias),	 for	a	124%	
increase	in	the	amount	of	independence	generated	(from	0.17	to	0.38).	
A	similar	effect	is	seen	on	the	omnivore-favouring	landscape.	There,	a	
9%	reduction	in	total	independence	(from	1.69	to	1.54)	is	paid	to	gener-
ate	a	48%	increase	in	sharpness	(from	0.31	to	0.46).
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the	safe	confines	of	 the	 lab	(1993,	 1999,	2007).	The	hunt	 for	 “clinch-
ers”	leads	to	stable	results,	but	these	are	very	limited	in	their	applica-
tion.	Transporting	knowledge	 from	 laboratory	 settings	 into	 the	wild	
often	 involves	 dramatic	 switches	 in	 epistemic	 context	—	plausibly	
from	a	context	encouraging	an	obligate	strategy	to	one	favouring	an	
omnivore	strategy.	That	is,	applying	our	hard-won	knowledge	of	how	
things	behave	in	controlled	settings	—	where	obligate	strategies	often	
pay	dividends	—	to	the	world	outside	requires	variety-of-evidence	rea-
soning,	as	the	sheer	increased	complexity	and	heterogeneity	dulls	the	
evidence	 in	 the	 new	 context.	 Under	 these	 conditions,	method	 bias	
could	 lead	us	to	both	 ignore	routes	 to	better	discoveries	and	to	mis-
judge	the	importance	and	reliability	of	the	information	we	do	have.
Knowledge Generation & Community Standards
A	further	consequence	of	our	discussion	of	method	plurality,	bias,	and	
mismatch	concerns	what	a	philosophical	account	of	scientific	knowl-
edge	 should	 be	 like.	 Philosophers	 have	 often	 approached	 scientific	
evidence	narrowly:	the	philosophical	task	vis-à-vis scientific	evidence	
requires	 understanding	 confirmation	—	that	 is,	 explaining	 the	 rela-
tionship	between	observations	and	hypotheses.	It	strikes	us	that	con-
sideration	of	method	bias	puts	pressure	on	such	narrow	conceptions.	
One	 (admittedly	 caricatured)	 illustration	of	 a	narrow	 conception	
appeals	to	the	distinction	between	contexts	of	justification	and	discov-
ery.	Originally	coined	by	Reichenbach	(1938,	although	his	distinction	
was	quite	nuanced	—	see	Schickore	2014),	the	distinction	was	used	to	
carve	out	a	place	for	philosophical	analysis	vis-à-vis	science.	Roughly	
speaking,	 discovery is	 the	 processes	 by	which	 scientists	 conceive	 of,	
and	come	to,	scientific	theories,	as	well	as	the	business	of	generating	
evidence.	Justification involves	understanding	the	connection	between	
evidence	and	theories.	One	way	of	defending	a	narrow	conception	of	
science	is	to	say	the	latter,	rather	than	the	former,	is	the	proper	target	
of	analysis	(as	Popper	argued	in	The Logic of Scientific Discovery, 1934).	
The	logical	and	abstract	questions	of	justification	are	the	philosopher’s	
playground,	 while	 the	 messy,	 human	 side	 can	 be	 relegated	 to	 the	
vis-à-vis	 methodological	 pluralism.	Whether	 we	want to	 emphasize	
one	kind	of	 evidence,	 or	want	 a	diversity	of	 strategies,	 or	whatever,	
depends	crucially	on	what	we	want	to	do	with	the	scientific	evidence.	
A	circumstance	which	concerns	us	is	when	method	bias	acts	to	dimin-
ish	exactly	the	kind	of	evidence	we	want.	For	example,	an	emphasis	on	
highly	focused	—	sharp	—	experimental	evidence	could	lead	us	to	mis-
understand	how	our	results	will	play	out	in	the	complex,	interdepen-
dent	world	beyond	the	lab.	Where	the	costs	of	getting	things	wrong	
matter,	and	they	often	do,	getting	it	right	involves	understanding	the	
limitations	of	the	evidence	we	are	able	to	generate.
Egregious	method	bias	and	mismatch	are	particularly	problematic	
in	 circumstances	where	 scientific	 results	 are,	 as	 it	were,	 in	 the	 pub-
lic	eye:	when	they	matter	for	public	policy,	for	instance.	Preferring	a	
kind	of	evidence	which	is	inappropriate	to	context	could	result	in	mis-
management,	 and	misunderstanding	 the	 stability,	 accuracy,	 or	 trust-
worthiness	of	scientific	claims.	Our	technological	prowess	is	plausibly	
outpacing	our	 scientific	understanding,	and	 it	becomes	 increasingly	
difficult	 to	 understand	 the	 impact	 that	 interventions	 (intentional	 or	
not)	might	have	on	complex,	large-scale	systems.	Considering	method	
mismatch	and	method	bias	is	crucial	for	debates	about	the	validity	of	
scientific	studies	that	attempt	to	ascertain	the	effects	of	climate	change,	
the	effectiveness	of	medicinal	 treatments,	 the	safety	of	new	AI	 tech-
nologies,	and	so	forth	(Avin	et	al.	2018).	In	these	contexts,	we	should	
ask	whether	the	kinds	of	evidence	we	demand	and	want	are	appropri-
ate	to	both	the	task	at	hand,	and	the	kinds	of	questions	and	systems	
we’re	interested	in	knowing	about.	Insofar	as	scientific	results	guide	
policy,	preferring	one	sort	of	evidence	or	approach	when	another	 is	
more	appropriate	could	be	disastrous.
Often,	 the	 more-or-less	 unambiguous	 results	 of	 methodological	
obligates	 are	 seen	 as	 the	 gold	 standard	 of	 scientific	 success,	 but	 in	
some	contexts	 this	method	 is	 inappropriate.	And	often	 these	places	
are	just	where	such	risky	gaps	in	our	understanding	occur.	As	Nancy	
Cartwright	makes	particularly	vivid,	firmly	understood	knowledge	in	
highly	controlled	experimental	settings	often	collapses	once	it	leaves	
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To	 see	 this,	 recall	 our	 Bayesian	 sketches	 of	 independence	 and	
sharpness.	Read	narrowly,	pieces	of	Bayesian	evidence	just	are	obser-
vations	which	grant	reason	to	update	our	subjective	priors	pertaining	
to	relevant	hypotheses.	Powerful	formalisms	are	bought	to	the	fore	to	
demonstrate	how	various	aspects	of	evidence	can	be	incorporated	into	
this	probabilistic	picture.	And	indeed,	this	is	often	an	enlightening	and	
rich	way	of	proceeding.29 
Although	Bayesian	machinery	can	precisify	what	we	mean	by	 in-
dependence	 and	 sharpness,	 it	 doesn’t	 follow	 from	 this	 that	 the	ma-
chinery	captures	what	matters	about	sharpness	or	independence.	First,	
it	does	not	tell	us	under	what	epistemic	circumstances	sharpness	or	
independence	ought	 to	be	 favoured.	That	 is,	 although	 the	Bayesian	
can	combine	the	two	measures,	and	accommodate	them,	she	cannot	
link	them	to	evidential	context.	To	do	this,	we	would	need	to	either	
represent	something	like	our	epistemic	landscape	or,	in	a	less	abstract	
mood,	characterize	the	actual	conditions	scientists	are	working	under	
and	 the	 actual	 aims	 they	 have.	A	 Bayesian	 precisification	might	 ex-
plain	why,	for	instance,	variety-of-evidence	reasoning	can	be	epistemi-
cally	powerful,	but	it	cannot	explain	why	scientists	might	need	to	“do	
things	differently”	in	different	contexts.	That	is,	it	cannot	explain	why	
one	group	of	scientists	adopting	an	obligate	strategy	is	the	right	thing	
to	do,	while	another	group	adopting	an	omnivore	strategy	is	the	right	
thing	to	do.	Epistemic	situations,	then,	are	a	crucial	part	of	the	context	
of	justification.	
Second,	 such	 a	 precisification	 cannot	 explain	 community	 stan-
dards	—	method	 biases	—	that	 shape	 how	 a	 scientific	 community	 be-
haves.	That	is,	in	addition	to	missing	epistemic	context,	they	also	can-
not	 accommodate	 epistemic	 situations.	 And	 our	 modelling	 demon-
strates	how	important	such	biases	might	be	for	the	epistemic	success	
of	those	communities:	by	maintaining	a	diversity	of	strategies,	for	ex-
ample,	or	for	targeting	particular	evidential	properties.	Understanding	
29.	Wallach	 (2016),	 for	 instance,	has	no	problem	fitting	diverse	archaeological	
evidence	into	a	Bayesian	framework.
dustbin	of	“discovery”.	As	such,	when	philosophers	consider	science,	
we	 should	enquire	after	 the	 connection	between	 theories,	 evidence,	
and	the	world	—	understanding	those	issues	provides	the	philosophi-
cal	essence	of	science.
Philosophers	have	applied	pressure	on	these	views	for	a	long	time.	
The	narrow	view	misses	important	aspects	of	scientific	practice	neces-
sary	 for	understanding	 its	very	success,	progress,	and	stability.	Such	
arguments	take	multiple	forms.	One	set	argues	that	justification	itself	
has	 non-epistemic	 properties,	 often	 due	 to	 inductive	 risk	 (Douglas	
2000).	Another	set	argues	that	justification	is	found	in	places	usually	
associated	with	discovery:	specifically,	 the	social	organization	of	sci-
ence	plays	an	important	role	in	preserving	and	supporting	its	stability	
(Longino	1990).	A	third	set	argues	that	scientific	goods,	 the	outputs	
and	aims	of	their	investigations,	are	not	limited	to	well-supported	the-
ories	—	scientists	 are	 also	 interested	 in	building	 storehouses	of	 data	
(Hacking	1983),	provisioning	understanding	(Potochnik	2017),	and	so	
on.	What	unifies	these	critiques	is	the	claim	that	narrow	conceptions	
are	just	too	narrow.	
Our	 critique	 is	 complementary:	 as	evidence	comes	 in	a	 range	of	
flavours,	and	(crucially)	 in	different	contexts	some	flavours	perform	
better	 than	 others,	 combining	 them	 into	 a	 single	 relation	 between	
hypotheses	and	theories	obscures	 the	different	work	 they	do.28	And	
indeed,	this	becomes	particularly	problematic	in	light	of	method	bias.	
If	different	communities	have	different	ideas	about	what	good	science	
is	 like,	and	use	 these	 to	guide	how	the	community	develops,	under-
standing	 different	 evidential	 properties	 and	 scientific	 strategies	 is	
necessary	for	understanding	that	evidence.	That	is,	the	relationships	
between	evidential	context	and	community	standards	are	an	essential	
part	of	a	philosophy	of	scientific	knowledge	generation:	they	are	part	
of	the	context	of	justification.
28.	We	think	analogous	arguments	can	be	found.	Toulmin’s	position	that	scientif-
ic	reasoning	should	focus	on	warrants	rather	than	logical	relationships	(1958)	
and	Norton’s	defence	of	a	material	 theory	of	 induction	(2003)	both	can	be	
read	as	making	something	like	this	argument.
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tion	—	as	such,	we	take	consideration	of	method	pluralism	to	further	a	
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phers	themselves.
7. Conclusion
Our	aim	in	this	paper	has	been,	first,	to	introduce	the	notion	of	meth-
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ther,	potentially	testable,	claims	about	scientific	communities.	Insofar	
as	 the	epistemic	 landscape	will	 favour	 certain	kinds	of	 studies,	pub-
lishing	bias	can	affect	this	by	increasing	efficiency,	diversity,	or	both.	
Moreover,	it	is	plausible	that	positive	discrimination	works	better	than	
negative	discrimination	—	make	it	easier	for	the	little	guy,	not	harder	
for	the	big	guy.	The	trade-offs	faced	are	not	simple;	sometimes	at	least	
the	introduction	of	method	bias	of	the	sort	discussed	here	will	have	
greater	gains	 than	 losses.	Such	considerations,	we	 think,	motivate	a	
richer,	more	local	understanding	of	the	nature	of	scientific	evidence	
and	confirmation.
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